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Since World War II, direct foreign investment has become
the dominant form in the international movement of private
capital. Although the bulk of such kind of investment has thus
far been directed to the developed countries,) there is an
increasing amount of interest and money directed to the less
developed countries. Many explanations have been offered for
this tendency. Perhaps the most important and most direct one is
that the less developed countries have come to realise the
important contributions, especially the transfer of technical
know-how and management experience, which direct private foreign
investment can bring to their economies. With this realisation,
the less developed countries have promulgated investment laws and
statutes providing various incentives to foreign investorso They
have also built industrial estates, set up investment promotion
centres, and undertaken a number of other things to facilitate
foreign investment.
As in the case of other less developed nations, Singapore
has since late 1950's been eager to develop its industry and to
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attract direct foreign investment for that purpose. To-day, with
Singapore's success in encouraging the inflow of foreign capital
and technical know-how, no less than thirteen countries have a
stake in Singapore. The third in the list is Hong Kong, whose
investment in Singapore was made almost entirely by Chinese,
nong nong's airect investment in Singapore has progressed
rapidly since 1967, due apparently to the capital flight as a
result of riots then befalling Hong Kong. But this is not the
only explanation. The special relationship between Hong Kong
and Singapore, the similar trend in the recent economic develop-
ment of these two economies, and a number of other factors may
be even more important. It is in search of these factors as well
as for an overall understanding and evaluation of the performance
and impact of Hong Kong's direct investment in Singapore that the
present study is undertaken.
More specifically, this study attempts to explore and
analyze the following problems:
1. nv+n nvug Au lnaustirlallszs decided to invest in
Singapore? What factors made them choosing Singapore as an
investing place?
2• au a6 are -cne scope, characteristics and importance of
Hong Kong's private direct investment in Singapore? How firms
with Hong Kong capital operate there?
33. What are the major problems that firms with Hong Kong
capital have been confronting in Singapore?
4• What are the contributions of Hong Kong's private
direct investment to Singapore's economy?
Because of time limitations and difficulties in obtain-
ing data other than those on manufacturing industries, the
present study has to confine itself to Hong Kong's private direct
investment in manufacturing industries in Singaporeo
RESEARCHMETHODOLOGY
The methods used for this study are mainly library researcI
and questionnaire survey, supplemented with personal interviews.
Library research covers the annual reports of the Economic
Development Board of Singapore (EDB) , Singapore's Year Book of
Statistics, books concerning foreign investment, trade bulletins,
business journals and periodicals, and newspapers. It was carried
out at various institutions, including the Chinese University,
University of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Management Association,
the Commerce and Industry Department of Hong Kong, and EDB (both
Singapore and Hong Kong).
Before questionnaire forms were prepared and mailed out,
preliminary interviews with two officers of EDB and a few execu-
tives of Singapore firms with major Hong Kong capital participation
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were made by the writer. The term Hong Kong capital is meant in
this study the capital that has been transferred out from Hong Kong
to Singapore by Hong Kong residents regardless of whether they
are Chinese or people of other nationalities.
The questionnaire survey was undertaken in February, 1971.
Based on Singapore EDB's information, questionnaire forms together
with addressing letters were mailed to 93 Singapore firms which
were known to have either 10% or partial participation by Hong
Kong capital. Of these 93 questionnaire forms, 7 were returned as
undeliverable, 6 were returned with remarks that they did not have
any capital from Hong Kong or they were not in the position to
answer. Only 20 were completed or partially completed and returned,
with the remaining firms giving no response. In order to get more
information, personal interviews were made by the writer in March
and April, 1971 with the directors or managers of eight Hong Kong
companies which had subsidiaries or associated companies in
Singapore.
Statistical analysis made in this study is mainly based
on EDB's Annual Reports, Singapore's Year Book of Statistics,
questionnaire survey results, and unpublished data obtained
directly by the writer from EDB. In utilizing the results of the
survey, the writer has kept in strict confidence the names of the
respondent firms .
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PRIVATE FOREIGJNDIRECT INVESTMENTIN SINGAPORE:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW
In 19b1, Singapore launched its first ambitious and
vigorous industrialisation program as contained in its Four-Year
Development Plan.2 Along with this program, Singapore adopted
measures to actively encourage foreign investment in new industries
to produce both for local markets and for export. However, the
actual amount of foreign investment in manufacturing industries
was very small prior to 1965.
in August, lyn7, Singapore withdrew rrom Malaysia and
became an independent nation. Being independent, it had complete
freedom to plan for industrial development and to use various fiscal
and industrial incentives to attract foreign investors, supplemented
by intensive promotion and publicity abroad through its investment
promotion centres. Since then, the flow of private direct invest-
ment to Singapore has increased rapidly, as can be seen from TABLE
I-1.
TABLE I-1
TOTAL AND FOREIGN CAPITAL IN SINGAPORE'S MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES (IN S$ MILLION) t SELECTEDYEARS
Total paid-up Foreign paid- Foreign as %Year
capital up capital of total
Mar, 31, 19b4* 51 .0 36.2 75Dec. 31, 1965 154.0 71.0 4b
Dec. 31, 1967 243.0 122.0 50Dec . 31 9 1965 220.0402.0 55Dec. 31 , 1969 937.0 476.3 51
Note: *Pioneer firms only* Prior to the introduction of the
Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax)-
(Amendment) Act, 1970 on July 22, 1970, pioneer firms were
those which manufactured commodities that were not yet
produced in Singapore or not produced in sufficient
quantities to meet local requirements, or were produced
primarily for export. In the Amendment Act (1970), pioneer
firms are those which have been or are intended to be
incurred a minimumfixed capital expenditure of Sop 1 mill for
in Singapore.
Source-, Based mainly on data contained in EDB's annual reports.
Today, there are over thirteen countries which have a stake
in Singapore. By the end of 1969, foreign industrialists have
invested more than S476 million in Singapore, representing 51% of
the total paid-up capital of Singapore's manufacturing industries.
The United Kingdom, United States, Hong Kong and Japan are the
main sources of foreign investment. Other sources include Indonesia,
Malaysia, Australia, Taiwan and Continental Europe, The sources of
private foreign investment in Singapore by country of origin is
Shown in TABLE 1-2.
TABLE 1-2
SOURCESOF FOREIGN INVESTMENTIN SINGAPORE(IN S$ MILLION)
AS ATENDOF1969
Country Paid-up capital Percent of total
United Kingdom 170 35.7
United States 120 25.2
Hong Kong 50 10.5
Japan 31 6.5
Indonesia 31 6.5
Malaysia 23 4.$Australia 22 40bTaiwan
.l$ 3.$Continental Europe 11 2.3
Total 476 99.9
Source: Singapore International Chamber of Commerce, Economic
Bulletin, August 31, 1970, U. 18.
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On the basis of country of origin, the British industria-
lists have an investment of S$170 million, or about 367o of all
foreign investment in Singapore. The bulk of this investment
has been in petroleum and petroleum products, with metals and
engineering being second in importance. It is expected that
more British investment will be induced by Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew's new investment guarantee scheme--to be backed by
Singapore's sterling reserves in London.3
Investment from United States source is less than from
British source. The larger part of American investment is also
in the petroleum and petroleum products while a good part of the
remainder is in electrical and electronic products. In addition,
additional investments in oil refining are underway, which would
further increase the degree of concentration of United States
investment in petroleum and petroleum products.
In the case of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong industrialists
have invested a total of S$50 million, which is the third
largest amount from various foreign sources. The greater part
of the investment has been concentrated in textiles and garments,
and chemicals and chemical products.
The major areas of investments by foreign capital by
country of origin is shown in TABLE 1-3.
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TABLE 1-3
MAIN DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTBY INDUSTRIAL
GROUPSAT END OF 1969
Country Main areas of investment
UnitedKingdom1. Petroleumandpetroleumproducts
2. IvIetals and engineering products
3. Chemicals and chemical proucts
UnitedStates1. Petroleumandpetroleumproducts
2. Electrical and electronic products
3. Printing and publishing
HongKong1. Textilesandgarments
2. Chemicals and chemical'products
3. Plastic products
Japan1. Transportequipment
20 Rubber and leather products
3. Textiles and garments
Indonesia1, Textilesandgarments
2. Wood and paper products
3. Non-metallic mineral products
Malaysia1. Foodandbeverages
2. Rubber and leather products
3. N on-metallic mineral products
Australia 1. Metal andengineeringproducts
2. Non-metallic mineral products
3. Food and beverages
Taiwan1. Woodandpaperproducts
2. Chemicals and chemical products















As shown in TABLE I-4, of this total foreign investment
the largest portion was invested in petroleum and petroleum
products, which accounted for 41% of the total. This was
followed by textiles and garments which accounted for 10% of the
total. The smallest portion was invested in plastic products,
accounting for 1.0116 only.
TABLE 1-4
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGNINVESTMENTIN SINGAPORE(IN S$' 000) BY
INDUSTRIAL GROUPSAS OF MARCH319 1970
Paid-up capital Investment in fixed assetsIndustrial group Amount Percent Amount Percent
Petroleum and petroleum
1$7,975products 40.8 432, 493 54.6
Textiles and garments 45,644 9.9 52,176 6.6
Metals and engineering
6.$products 31,295 32,178 4.1Electrical and electr-
onic products 24,051 5.2 50,572 6.4Chemicals and chemical
products 22t452 4.9 30t4$9 3.9Food and beverages 19,765 4.3 27,985 3.519,655Wood and paper products 4.3 20,773 2.6Rubber and leather
products 19:543 4.2 26,843 3.4Transport equipments 17 ,970 3.9 45t247 5.7Non-metallic mineral
products 15,031 3.3 25,169 3s2Plastic products b,262 1.4 7,233 .9Miscellaneous 50,572 11.0 4U, 453 5.1
Total
Note: *This figure is smaller than the figures released by
Singapore International Chamber of Commerce and EDBAnnual Report. 1969
Source: Calculated from data supplied to the writer by EDBo
460,226* 100.0 791,916 100.0
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FOOTNOTES
1. In a survey published in Oct., 1970 by the Office of Business
Economics, U.S Dept. of Commerce, it was reported that U.S.
are heavily increasing their direct investment overseas, but
are shying away from under-developed countries. For example,
the value of U.S. direct investment abroad increased by US$
M billion in 1969, about US $0.3 billion more than 196e.
The developed countries, which includes Canada, Western
Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Japan
accounted for US$4.2 billion or 73% of the total amount*
See U.S Dept* of Commerce, The International Investment
Position of U.S.: Developments in 1969 in Survey of Current
Business, Oct., 1970.
2. Singapore started with the first development plan for 1961-
64, and revised to cover the five-year period 1961-65 when it
seceded from Malaysia and became an independent Republic on
Aug. 9, 1965• A second five-year plan for 1966-70 was passed
and printed, but not made public. Subsequently, a counter-
recession program for 1968-71 was formulated soon after the
announcement in Jan. 1, 196$ by the United Kingdom of the
advance in the date of the British military withdrawal by the
end of 1971, instead of 1975 as originally contemplated. See
H.D. Fong, Strategy of Economic Development in Singapore,
Singapore: Eurasia Press, 1970, pp. 27-2$.
3. The scheme is designed to protect British investment in Singa-
pore for a period of eight years against non-commercial risks
of expropriation without compensation and non-convertibility
of profits* According to.'the agreement, which is the first of
its kind ever signed by Singapore with a foreign country,
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investments made in Singapore by people resident in the United
Kingdom or by companies incorporated there, and accepted by
the Singapore Government between Jan. 1$, 1971 and June 30,
1973, will be eligible for this guaranty scheme. For each
approved investment, the Singapore Government will transfer
to the Trust Fund (in London) sterling assets equal. to 1050
of the value of the investment plus two yeais estimated.
profits not exceeding 30% of the value of the investment.






Both Hong Kong and Singapore started as British colonies
over a hundred years ago. While Hong Kong still remains a colony
of the United Kingdom, Singapore became an autonomous state within
the Commonwealth in 1959 and has become an independent Republic
since August 1965.
The economies of Hong Kong and Singapore have much in
common. They are both small in area, high in population density,
and poor in natural endowment. They both started with an entrepot
economy base, then striving to branch out into service and
manufacturing industries. Hong Kong started out on its road to
industrialisation in early fifties, while Singapore followed the
same path about a decade later.
The achievement of Hong Kong in transforming an entrepot
to a modern industrial centre.not only gave Singapore the needed.
confidence, but also a very useful guide. Thus, in order to
understand the recent economic development of Singapore, it might
be helpful to take a brief look at the experience of the structural
change of Hong Kong's economv.
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THE EXPERIENCEOP HONGKONG
Prior to World War II, Hong Kong was primarily an
entrepot connecting Southern China with the remainder of the
world, During war period, its entrepot trade declined almost
to nothing. The early post-war years saw a revival in the
entrepot trade, reaching its peak point in 1951 when the value
index of Hong Kong's total trade was 254 (1945=100). In May
1951, the United Nations imposed embargo on Mainland China, and
within three years' time, Hong Kong's entrepot trade declined
sharply and reached its lowest point in 1954.1
This drastic reduction in the Colony's traditional
economic activities, however, served as a powerful stimulus to
the Colony in its efforts to find a new source of wealth in
manufacturing industries, It forced government officials,
bankers as well as managers of the British trading firms and
local businessmen to switch their attention to the encouragement
and development of industry.
Even before this conscious industrialisation effort got
underway, there were already several factors which were conducive
to Hong Kong's industrial development. First, there was a large,
continuous inflow of industrialists, trained professionals, and
skilled workers from Mainland China from late 1940's to early
1950's. These immigrants gave Hong Kong its most valuable
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economic asset. They not only brought into Hong Kong the capital
and plant and equipment, but also the experience and know-how of
managers, supervisors and engineers. Since most of these immigr-
ants had experience in textile industry, the first major industry
that witnessed rapid development in Hong Kong in the early 1950's
was the textile industry.
Second, along with the large inflow of experienced indus-
trialists and trained professionals, there was a much larger inflow
of refugees who brought with them almost nothing except their own
labour.2 This huge inflow of refugees created a tremendous employ-
ment problem which could hardly find its solution in the declining
entrepot trade of the Colony. Nor could the rocky lands of the
Colony provide much employment opportunity in agriculture. The
solution had therefore to be found in. industry. Thus, in the
early 1950's there witnessed a rapid growth in the number of
small-scale industrial undertakings which utilised the cheap labour
provided by the refugees froma_i nl and rri ra
Third, as a free port, Hong Kong enjoyed many advantages
such as cheap food supply, low taxation, no trade or exchange
restrictions, etc. Mo'COve ', it had well-established trading,
banking and insurance facilities and a stable government. All
this provided an excellent environment for investors from all parts
of the world.
In 1954, Hon Kong had 2, 494 industrial undertakings
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employing 115,453 workers.-' By the end of 1970, it has 17,239
industrial undertakings employing 589,505 workers.4 Its domestic
production has grown dramatically and its foreign sales have
soared to more than HK$10,000 million in 1969, a 25% increase
over 1968.5
Today, despite its paucity in industrial materials and
limited domestic market, Hong Kong's industries have made remark-
able progress and the city is now one of the leading industrial
centres in the developing region, exporting industrial products
to various parts of the world.
RECENTECONOMICDEVELOPMENTOF SINGAPORE
Singapore, a newly independent city-state, has an area of
225 square miles and a population of around two million. In its
150 years of history, its economy was based mainly on entrepot
trade and related activities.
After World War II, the entrepot economy and its service
industries were not able to absorb the ever-increasing number of
jok-seekers. Faced with this situation, the Government of
Singapore soon realised the necessity of developing manufacturing
industries to supplement entrepot trade and ultimately to change
the structure of the economy with respect to the source and
composition of income.
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Today, the economic structure of Singapore has under-
gone a remarkable change as compared with the days when Singa-
pore first obtained its status of an autonomous state within
the Commonwealth in 1959. The formerly predominant service
type of economy, which was closely related to the entrepot
trade and allied services, has declined in importance. Its
relative share in GDP (at factor cost)-has fallen from 1959's
60.6% to 1969's 72.$x%, On the other hand, industrialisation
efforts since early 1960's has brought about a-sharp increase
in the share of secondary industries from 13% in 1959 to 24%
in 1969. The most important rise was in the manufacturing
sector, whose share rose from $.7% to 17.1% during the same
period.6
PROMENTREPOTTRADETO INDUSTRIALISATION
Singapore has benefited since its earliest days from its
strategic position on one of the world's great trade routes.
Within a few years of its foundation in 1$19, the trading post
had become a major entrepot centre. Later on, the opening of
Suez Canel in 1669 and the development of Australia, Japan and
the American West provided new trading opportunities for
Singapore. Singapore prospered and its trading houses multiDlied_
However, the entrepot trade itself was not adequate to
sustain the island's economy durin the Aost-wax years. Two
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main factors are responsible for it.
First, the growing unemployment as a result of the rapid
rise of population. According to Singapore's 1961-64 Development
Plan, the average annual population increase between the census
years 1947 and 1957 was 4.3%, of which 3o6% was due to natural
increase and 0.7% to migratory surplus.7 The population of
Singapore was 935,200 in 1947, 1,445,900 in 1957 and 1,579,600
in 1959.8 It was estimated in the Development Plan that there
were probably some 46,000 persons out of work in 1959, or about
10% of the economically active population. Moreover, it was
estimated that 83,000 new jobs will have to be created by 1964.9
Thus it is evident that any conceivable expansion of the entrepot
trade would not be able to solve the unemployment problem because
the import-export business was not particularly labour-intensive.
Second, the policies of the newly emerging countries in
Southeast Asia to open ports of their own to avoid dependence on
Singapore for trade serviced This is particularly true with
Singapore's two neighbouring countries of Indonesia and Malaya,
both of them were Singapore's long-term clients in the entrepot
trade.
According to the 1957 census, about 20% of the total
number of the economically active persons in Singapore were
engaged in secondary industries compared with 70% in tertiary
industries.10 But after taking note of the fact that the volume
18
of entrepot trade was more or less stagnant during 1955-59,--
the Government of Singapore envisaged in its Four-Year Plan an
increase of some 30,000 new jobs during the plan period if
maximum acceleration in industrialisation could be achieved
and if a sufficient volume of private investment in industries
could be induced.12
The Government of Singapore started to encourage the
growth of industrial sector as soon as Singapore became an auto-
nomous state in 1959• But it was only in 1960-61 that a massive
program of industrialisation was finally drawn up by its Economic
Development Board. Since then, the industrialisation of the
economy has got underway and the problem of unemployment, although
13still exists, has greatly subsided.
Statistics-can best reflect the momentumof growth in
Singapore over the decade of 1959-69. GDP (at factor cost) grew
from S41,966 million in 1959 to S$4,633 million in 1969, a 145%
increase in 10 years. Industrial output grew at a compound rate
of 16.2% per annum, from S$256 million in 1959 jumped to S$1,154
in 1969.14
In manufacturing (see TABLE II-1), as of end of 1969,
there were 67,127 persons employed by 1, 716 factories with a
total production value of S$2,636 million. The value of direct
exports of Singapore-made products reached an all-time high of
S$760 million in 1969, which is more than double the export
value has increased, on the average, by more than 21% per annum.
TABLE II-1
GROWTHTRENDOF MANUFACTURINGESTABLISHMENTS
IN SINGAPOREWITH 10 OR MOREWORKERS
1965-69 % change1959 1965 1969 per annum
No. of establishments 1,000 1,716 14.4531
17.347,020 S7 ,125Employment (persons) 25,199
Output (3 million) 1,086 2,636 24.8399
Direct earn ort
(S$ million) n.a. 3 49 760 21 .4
Direct export as
of total sales n.as n.a.32 32
Source: Singapore Year Book, 1969, p, 97•
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FOOTNOTES
1. See Edward Szczpanik, The Economic Growth of Hong Kong, London,
Oxford University Press. 1958. DD. 45 and 47.
2. The total number flowed into Hong Kong during this period was
estimated about 700,000 persons. See Edward Szczpanik, M. cit.,
p o 27.
3. Hong Kong Government, Annual Report. 1956. D. 30.
4. Hong Kong Government, Annual Report, 1970, p. 260
5* David Baird, Too Good to be True?, Far Eastern Economic Review,
March 5, 1970, p. 32.
6o See Finance Minister's 1970 Budget Statement, in ParliamentzrF
Debates, Singapore, Official Report, Vol. 29, No. 8, March 9,
170.
To State of Singapore, Ministry of Finance, Development Plan 1961-
64, Singapore, Government Printer, 1961, p. 1.
$, See Year Book of Statistics, Singapore, 1969, p. 9 ,and Singapore
Economic Development Board Annual Report, 1969, p. 50.
9. See State of Singapore, Ministry of Finance, op, cit., pp. 6 and
590
10. See S.C. Chua, Report on the Census o Population, 1957, Singapore,
Government Printer, 1964, pe S2.
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11 o See State of Singapore, Ministry of Finance, 2P-o ci.t o, P. 13
12. Ibid, p o 59s
13. For example, the total number of persons on the Live Register
of the Employment Exchange as on. Jan. 31, 1971 was 42,149.
This was 1,506 less than the figure registered on Dec. 31, 1970
and a decrease of 10,585 over the figure a year ago. See The
mirror (Singapore), March 8, 1971.




S INGAPORE' S INVESTMENTCLIMATE
In the post-war years, most of the private direct
foreign investment has taken place in the developed countries
instead of in the less developed countries.l This is quite
understandable. There is the fear of nationalisation or
expropriation without compensation by the government of the
less developed countries. There is also the fear that such
countries may adopt discriminatory measures against foreign
investors with regard to taxation, ownership, personnel, etc.
And there are a host of other factors: social, cultural,
political as well as economic.
however, the Singapore case is an exception. Instead
of putting up restrictions on foreign investment, the Govern-
ment of Singapore has adopted a policy of liberal incentives
with maximum assistance towards foreign investors. In its
1959 legislation on foreign investment, it guarantees the
right of foreign investors to repatriate capital and profits,
and it gives foreign investors the same opportunity to enjoy
tax concessions and tariff protection for essential industries.
With its success in attracting foreign investment, hundreds of
firms over thirteen countries have -invested more than S$476
million in Singapore's manufacturing industries, It is the
23
purpose of this chapter to examine the conditions that have
contributed to this success, and, in order to obtain a balanced
picture, the unfavourable aspect will also be examined as well.
FAVOURABLECONDITIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT
SINGAPORE'S STRATEGICLOCATION
o-uanaing ai ine crossroaas oz intiernatiionai tiraae rouses,
Singapore offers excellent facilities for the operation of
international firms. It has an excellent deep-water harbour and
seaport strategically located with easy access to both raw
materials and markets. The Port of Singapore Authority--the
fourth in the world and the biggest in Southeast Asia--with its
facilities for merchandising, warehousing and shipping, figures
prominently in serving the import and export needs of that
region.
Singapore is also the financial and commercial hub of
Southeast Asia. Its banking and insurance facilities are the
most efficient in that region. In addition, it is served by
over twenty seven international airlines and a, comprehensive
telecommunications system. Excellent road and railways





Actual expenditure Per cent of total
1. Economic development: 213,04 62.0
l)Industrial develop- 70.47 20.5
ment
(1)Jurong new town 33.6e 9.S(2)Other industrial
estates 21 .43 6.2(3)Industrial train-
in 0.22 0.06(4)Industrial finn-
ing 15.14 4.4
2)Public utilities 68.00 19 ,$
3)Transport develop-
ment 24.99 7.3





7)Primary production 0.76 0.2
2. Social development: 95.42 27.8
3. Public administration
and defence: 34.86 10.2
Total 343.34 100.0
(1)+(2)+(3)+2)+3)+4)+5)+2: 292.34 85.2
Source: Extracted from Singapore Year Book 1969, Appendix X.
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Singapore has devoted a considerable proportion of its
development expenditure to the provision of economic and social
infrastructure. For the year 1969, the total provision for this
purpose amounted to 5292.34 million, or $5/a of total develop-
ment expenditure. As seen from TABLE III-1, major items of
economic and social infrastructure include: public utilities,
industrial estates, industrial training, transport development,
communication and social development. The following gives a
brief factual description of some of these items.
l.Public Utilities:
Singapore has an installed generating capacity of 564
megawatts and is building an. additional 360. Power consumption
by industrial users jumped from 331 million kilowatts hours in
1963 to 1,058 million kilowatt hours in 196Q. 2
Water consumption averages 100 million gallons a clay .3
To ensure continuity of supply, the impounding capacity of one
of the major reservoirs in Singapore, Seletar reservoir, has
increased from 150 million gallons to 5.3 billion gallons.
Gas is manufactured at the main gas work in Kallang,
the largest gas container in the whole of Southeast Asia, which
has at present an installed capacity of 1.0.5 million cubit feet
per day. Gas produced is stored in two main gas holders in
kallang and in Queenstown.
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2. Industrial Estates:
The Government of Singapore has developed some fourteen
industrial estates and areas, the biggest one being the Jurong
Industrial Estate. This estate will eventually become a self-
contained industrial setallite town with some half million
people and an area of 17,000 acres. At present, it has its own
deep-water harbour and railway line and is provided with adequ-
ate power, water and telecommunications. It provides sites
logically grouped for heavy, general and light, and special
industries that need wharf frontage. Facilities for deep sea
fishing are also being built.
In addition to Jurong Industrial Estate, there are a
number of smaller industrial estates in various parts of
Singapore where a diverse range of light industries have been
established. They include: Redhill, Kampong Ampat, Bendemeer,
Tanglin Halt, and Kallang Park. The latter one is reserved
for boat-building, marine and allied industries. Two more
estates are being developed, one at Kallang Basin for miscell-
aneous light industries and the other at Kranji for a modern
timber and timber products industrial complex.
3. Education and Training!
In Singapore, school-age children are entitled to six
years of free primary education. Education at secondary and
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tertiary levels is also under expansion under the Second Five--
Year (1966-1970) Development plan.4
Besides general education, the normal technical and
vocational training are provided by various technical and
industrial institutes and industrial training centers. Accord-
ing to estimates by Ministry of Education, the number of gradu-
ates from these training establishments-was only a few hundred
each year in 196$ and 1969, but will jump to 2,500 and 3,400 in
1970 and 1971 respectively.5
The Government of Singapore has launched a number of
manpower schemes to assist new industries. Among them, one is
the Industrial Development Scholarship Scheme under which the
Government may contribute up to 50% of the cost paid by indus-
tries for sending personnel for overseas training. The other
is the Trainee Release Scheme under which the Government
releases to industries the graduates from its general scholar-
ships program. The Government's EDB also conducts short mana-
gement training courses in conjunction with the Singapore
Institute of Management.
AMPLE, SUPPLYOF COMMONLABOUR
Singapore has no shortage of commonlabour supply. For
one thing, there were 42,149 people on the live unemployment
registers of Ministry of Labour as on Jan. 31, 1971.6 For
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another thing, the British decision of complete withdrawal of
its military forces before the end of 1971 would release a
large number of labourers.7 Besides, it is estimated that there
are some 30,000 young men entering the labour market each year
after the completion of at least nine years of schooling. Thus
Singapore has an ample supply of labour, except for the highly
skilled ones.
ADEQUATEFINANCING FACILITIES
Singapore's reputation as a budding financial centre
was greatly enhanced when its Asian dollar market, patterned
after the Euro-•dollar market, was started at the beginning of
19699 A year later, the Chartered Bank announced that it was
setting up a Chartered Merchant Bankers Ltd. in Singapore,
which was claimed to be the first merchant bank in Southeast
Asia.
The capital market of Singapore is reasonably well
developed. Over two hundred companies are listed on the Stock
Exchange of Malaysia and Singapore. It is believed that funds
can be easily raised in the local capital market since most of
the new issues in the past years have been oversubscribed.
Singapore has a very well developed banking system,
with thirty seven banks operating more than one hundred and
fifty branches throughout the island. This is considered
adequate. The total assets of all banks in Singapore amounted to
S1, 827.7 million in 1962 and S$4)274 million at the end of 1969.8
It is noteworthy that loans and advances to manufacturing industr.--
ies have increased sharply during the 1962-1969 period. This can0.0
be seen from the following table:
TABLEI1I--2
LOANSAND ADVANCESTO CUSTOMERSOTHERTHAN BANKS
AT END OF 1962 AND 1969
Unit: SS0000
1962 1969
1. Singapore Government and other
public authorities 32
2. Agriculture 16,3733$,978
10,7633 • Mining and quarrying 11, 96
4 • Manufacturing 93:463 447, 503
5. Construction 19,192 48,083
6. General commerce 629,695377,146
7. Others 191,5$4 573,563
Total 19727,145731 ,128
Ratio of 4 to total 12% 26%
Source: Extracted from Year Book of Statistics, Singapore,
1969, p. 102,
The Development Bank of Singapore was established in Oct.,
1960 to take over the EDB's function of offering medium or long-
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term loans to industries. It normally finances up to 50% of
equipment cost and 60'0 of land and buildings. It is reported
that in 1969 the development loans by the Bank amounted to S$265
million, of which S$195 million was extended to manufacturing
firms.9
GOVERNMENTPOLICY AND INDUCEMENTS
to The Economic Development Board:
The Economic Development Board under the Ministry of
Finance was established in 1961 following the recommendation of
a United Nations Industrial Survey Team headed by Dr. Albert
Winsemlus. The EDB was designed as an overall agency for deve-
lopment whose main functions were to:10
1.) Promote investment in and establishment of new
industries, and modernisation and expansion of
existing ones
2) Provide a comprehensive industrial infrastructure
through the development of industrial estates and
sites with all necessary transport, communication
and utility services
3) Publicise industrial opportunities by the provision
of-information based on market surveys and project
feasibility studies
4) Provide financial assistance in the form of loans
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or direct capital participation
5) Provide further financial incentives through the
Pioneer Industries Ordinance by which pioneer
enterprises may obtain complete tax exemption for
5 years from date of production, and the consider-
ation of tariff protection for local industry
6) Provide technical assistance through the Board's
Technical Consultant Services, Light Industries
Services, Industrial Research Unit, and Management
and Industrial Training Facilities.
However, with the implementation and progress of the
industrialisation program, many of the Board's functions are
now taken over by many newly established agencies, such as the
Jurong Town Corporation (June, 1966), the Development Bank of
Singapore (July, 1966), the International Trading Company
(Nov., 196$) and the Neptune Orient Line (1969)0
2. Tax Incentives: 11
The basic tax incentives are provided in the Economic
Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act, 1967 which
include tax exemption for pioneer industries and plant expan-
sion, tax concessions for export enterprises and tax relief in
interest on approved foreign loans for productive equipment
and plant, on royalties or technical assistance fees and deve-
lopment contributions.
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Prior to the introduction of the Economic Expansion
Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) (Amendment) Act, 1970,
tax exemption for a pioneer firm was granted, depending on
the capital expenditure incurred on building, plant and
equipment for a period ranging from two to five years, plus
one year extension which is subject to the approval of the
Minister of Finance on the basis of its (the pioneer firm)
fixed capital expenditure incurred during the tax period.
Besides, a 4% flat rate of company tax (instead of 4(Y16 in
the ordinary case) was offered to the export enterprise for
a period up to 15 Years.
In the Amendment Act (1970), pioneer status with a
flat five-year tax relief is only available to those pioneer
enterprises which have incurred or intend to incur a minimum
fixed capital expenditure of S$l million in Singapore, while
the tax relief period for an export enterprise has been
reduced from fifteen to five years if it is not a pioneer
enterprise and to eight years if it is, However, the
fifteen-year tax relief period is still applicable to export
enterprises with fixed capital expenditure of S$1,000 million
or above, or enterprises with at least S$150 million but be-
low S$1,000 million, of which either the local equity parti-
cipation is above 50% or the Minister of Finance is of the
opinion that such export enterprise will promote or enhance
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the economic or technological development of Singapore.
3. Industrial Incentives:
1) Tariffs and quota restrictions
Before Aug . , 1965, customs tariff were applied to only a
few categories of goods. In Aug., 1965, upon seceding from
Malaysia, Singapore introduced protective duties on a series of
products besides quota restrictions to protect local manufactu-
rers. At present, tariffs are enforced on about 300 items of
imported manufacturing goods and semi-manufactured goods. At
the same time, to ensure that tariffs and.quotas do not affect
Singapore's traditional role as an entrepot centre, two free
trade zones have been established in 1969,
2) Financial assistance:
Prior to 1968, the EDB provided medium and long-term
loans to new industries with the loan amount usually not exceed-
ing 50% of the fixed assets required. Besides, it also acted as
a guarantor for local firms that purchased equipment from abroad.
Since Oct., 1968, the EDB's financing function has been taken
over by the Development Bank of Singapore Ltd., a joint venture
between the Government of Singapore and private investors. Up
to the end of 1969, this Bank has extended financial assistance
to 98 firms, of which about two-thirds (or 64) are joint ventures
or subsidiaries of foreign firms (52 joint ventures and 12 wholly
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foreign-owned subsidiaries), These 64 firms have received a
total of S200 million loans from the Bank, Which constitute
almost 75% of the Bank's total loans to new industries, 12
3) Technical assistance:
Technical advisory services provided by EDB are readily
available to new industrial enterprises. They include: facili-
ties for testing raw materials and finished products, facilities
for evaluating equipment and machinery, advice on product and
industrial design, advice on industrial engineering techniques,
and assistance to small enterprises in various forms.
4) Modernisation of labour legislation and improvement
of industrial relations:
The Employment Act, 1968 and the Industrial Relations
(Amendment) Act, 196$ provide a new basis for employer-employee
relationship in Singapore. The concept behind them is that
there should be less hidden benefits but more open rewards
which are to be tied to performance and productivity rather
than to the usual practice of seniority and collective bargain-
ing power. Among the important provisions are: reduction in
number of paid public holidays and paid sick leaves, restrict-
ions on overtime work and retirement benefits, non-negotiabili-
ty of such matters as selection, promotions, reclassifications,
transfers and acting appointments, etc.
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These two pieces of labour legislation are enacted to
create a climate of industrial peace and productivity conscious-
ness that will attract both local and foreign investors. Through
the efforts of the Ministry of Labour, the number of man-days
lost because of industrial disputes has decreased considerably,
and industrial relations have witnessed marked improvement from
1965 to 1970.
4. Special Incentives for Foreign Investors:
1) Free repatriation of profits and capital:
Foreign investors may bring any amount of capital into
Singapore. There is no restriction on the remittance of profits
and repatriation of capital in the currency of original invest-
ments, ion-residents with external accounts may remit their
deposits any time without restriction.
2) Permanent stay and citizenship:
An industrialist who deposits an amount of over S$250,000
with the Government for the purpose of investing in an approved
industry can obtain permanent residence in Singapore for himself
and his immeadiate family. After a minimum of five years'
permanent residence in Singapore, he and his family are eligible
to apply for Singapore citizenship. An industrialist who invests
the amount of . S$100, 000 in an approved industry in Singapore is
eligible for residence in Singapore together with his immeadiate
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family. As soon as the industry is established and the investor
actively participates in the running of the industry, he and his
family would be granted permanent residence. After a minimum of
five years' permanent residence in Singapore, he and his family
are eligible to apply for Singapore citizenship.
3) Double taxation relief:
Under present arrangements with several countries includ-
ing Malaysia, Japan, United Kingdom, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden and Australia, companies and individual are assured of
protection against double taxation. Negotiations are underway
with the United States, West Germany and other countries for
similar arrangements.
4) Foreign investors are free to organise their business
in any way they want within the provisions of the law, either as
a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary or as a joint venture with
local investors.
UNFAVOURABLECONDITIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT
As a small island, Singapore does not produce raw
materials or possess any mineral resources of commercial value.
Because of its small population and relatively low stage of
development, Singapore has only a limited domestic market and
must therefore export a substantial proportion of its manufact-
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ured products, However, these unfavourable factors do not
pose serious problems for Singapore because Singapore has easy
access to raw materials and its strategic location in interna-
tional trading routes should facilitate the development of its
export markets.
Perhaps the most important deficiency in Singapore, as
in other developing countries, is the shortage of skilled
workers, technicians and management personnel.13 Fortunately,
there are a number of Government-run schemes underway, and the
whole education system has been strongly oriented toward tech-
nology. in addition, the Government has decided to make it
easier for overseas trained specialists and management person-
nel to come to Singapore and migrants with useful skills will




1. For example, in a survey published in Oct., 1970 by the
Office of Business Economics, U.S. Dept, of Commerce, it was
reported that U.S. are heavily increasing their direct inve-
stment overseas, but are shying away from under-developed
countries. See U.S. Dept. of Commerce, The International
Investment Position of the U.S. : Development in 1969 in
Survey of Current Business, Oct., 1970.
2. See Year Book of Statistics, Singapore, 1969, p. 5$.
39 Ibid., p e 61o
4, See chapter 1 footnote 2.
5 • See One Year of Technical Education, April 196$-March 1969,
Technical Education Dept., Ministry of Education, Singapore,
1969, b, 11.
6. See The Mirror (Singapore), March 8, 1971.
7. In the Budget Speech on Dec, 3, 1968, the Finance Minister
estimated that the local personnel employed by the British
armed forces in Singapore would be reduced to 27,300 in Dec.,
1969, 19,500 in Dec., 1970, and nil in Dec., 1971. See
Parliamentary Debates, Sinere, Official Report, Vol. 28,
No. 1, Dec. 3-, 1968.
6. Year Book of Statistics, Singa, 1969, p . 100.
9. See The Mirror (Singapore), June 6, 1970.
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10. See Economic Development Board, Guide to 9stablisLiment of
Industry in Singapore, 1964.
11. Based on Republic of Singapore, Government Gazette, Acts
Supplement, No. 46, Aug. 7, 1970 and Peter K .F. Yap,
Singapore's Machinery and Development article in Univer-
sity of Singapore, the Business Administration Society,
The Journal of Business, Vol. 1, No. 5, 1970/71, p, 31.
12. See The Mirror (Singapore), June Q, 1970.
13. It is estimated that Singapore will be short of 450-500
engineers each year during 1971-75. Output of management
personnel will fall short by some 200 a year during 1971-
73. Also, the Republic is likely to be short of 1500-2000






By the end of 1950's, some Hong Kong industrialists had
established their subsidiary factories overseas or participated
in joint ventures with entrepreneurs in the host country. The
purpose was to retain or gain access to traditional markets.
In the sixties, this movement continued and seemed to have
accelerated, partly for market reasons, but more importantly,
as a hedge against commercial and political risks and as a means
of increasing output in the face of rising labour cost in Hong
Kong. Induce by Singapore's favourable climate for industrial
investment, many Hong Kong industrialists went to Singapore for
on-spot investigation, and some decided to invest there, espec-
ially during the second half of the 19601s. In this chapter,
the writer intends to examine the factors that led Hong Kong
investors to invest in Singapore.
REASONSFOR GOING ABROAD
There is no simple or straight-forward explanation as to
why private investors go abroad, although it is generally assumed
that the motivation is a higher rate of return at abroad than at
home* In the case of multinational firms profit maximization is
only one of a complex of goals--growth and efficiency considera-
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tions are at least equally important. The complexity of the
problem is shown in a survey made by Prof. Kolde of the motives
of 533 U.S. companies operating abroad.
TABLE IV-1
REASONSFOR INVESTING ABROAD
Primary reasons Per cent of sample
Legal restrictions (tariffs, quotas, etc.) 21
Lower cost of production (saving on
20labour, raw materials, or processing)
Inefficiency of native marketing institutions 14
Competition 12
Dissatisfaction with international middlemen 11
Long-range expansion policy 7




Source: E.J. Kolde, International Business Enterprise,
Prentice-Hall Inc . , Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,
1966, P• 233.
Quite often a company began its foreign operation as an
exporter and later on established production facilities abroad
when the foreign market became sufficiently large. An artificial
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stimulant to this type of investment is the import control. It
may be necessary to produce in a foreign country because of
tariffs or other limitations on imports.
There were others who came to carve out a new market for
themselves 'by taking advantage of non-price factors such as funds
and availability of the market, or by taking advantage of cost
factors and legal restrictions.
Foreign investment can also arise without any of these
apparent stimuli. The reason may lie in the advantages of
specialization. In some decreasing-cost industries, unit costs
fall as the scale of production increases. These industries
need a market larger than their domestic one in order to achieve
scale economy. A company may thus wish to concentrate the
manufacturing of certain product in one country.
We might, therefore, group the possible factors which
motivate the investors to go abroad as follows:
l) To meet increased export orders from abroad and to
obtain an export base for neighbouring markets
2) Grew out of trade with the host country
3) To avoid import control or high tariff wall
4) Government encouragement, inducement, and special
promotion measures and
5) Political security, economic stability, and growth
potential.
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The last two groups of factors are clearly of the nature
of investment climate. Although a favourable investment climate
may not be the sufficient condition for attracting foreign
investors, it is a necessary condition, especially for the less
developed countries. For such countries, this condition implies
that they must, first, have a sound industrial development
program and steadily strive for its implementation. Secondly,
they must adopt policies and measures favourable to foreign
investors, such as non-discrimination in treatment as to oviner-
ship and management control, income tax concessions, and favor-
able terms for earnings and principal transfer. Finally, they
must have available labour and social. and economic infrastruc-
ture,
REIkSO NS FOR HONGKONGINDUSTRIALISTS' CHOOSING
OF SINGAPOREAS AN INVESTING PLACE
As stated. in the end of last chapter, Singapore lacks
raw materials its domestic market is of limited size it is
short of management and technical personnel and, it has no
supporting industries. However, forces favourable to foreign
investors outweigh the unfavourable forces.
Singapore has substantial external economies. Its
social overhead capital is reasonably adequate compared with
that in the neighbouring countries. It has sound industrial
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development program and steadily strive for their implementation.
It has political stability and a clean and efficient government.
There is no shortage of commonlabour. Most importantly, the
Government of Singapore has adopted a liberal policy toward
foreign investment and has provided various incentive measures
to give maximumassistance to foreign investors, as already
elaborated in the last chapter.
For the prospective foreign investors, all these favour-
able factors were already strong enough to induce them to invest
in Singapore. For Hong Kong industrialists, they are further
prompted to go to Singapore by certain environmental considerations
that are peculiar to Hong Kong. These include:
1) The Hong Kong Government does not provide specific
incentives for private investment.
2) Hong Kong's industrialists must rely largely on their
own resources for development, banks usually do not
provide more than short-term loans to them.
3) The close proximity to Mainland China and the 1967
riot experience are the main worries of Hong Kong
industrialists. They consider the future of Hong
Kong as uncertain.
4) Hong Kong is no longer a place of cheap labour. As
a result of growth at an extermely fast rate, Hong
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Kong's labour supply situation has become tight in
the last three or four years. Its wage level is no
longer below that of Singapore.
SOMESURVEYFINDINGS
In the writer's Feb. 1971 survey of the 93 Singapore firms
which have 100/0 or partial Hong Kong capital participation, one
purpose is to identify the reasons why Hong Kong industrialists
chose Singapore as the investing place. Only 19 firms responded




Reasons for investing in Singapore No. of mention
To meet increased export orders from abroad
and to obtain an export base for
neighbouring markets 3.2
Government encouragement, inducement and
special promotion measures 11
Political security, economic stability and
growth potential e
To avoid import control or protective tariff 7
Grew out of trade with Singapore 5
Good industrial relations 3
Others 6
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One of the major reasons given by these respondent firms
is Singapore Government's encouragement, inducement and special
promotion measures. To give focus to this factor, the writer
has further explored into the relative importance of the various
incentive measures. Also, the writer has made inquiries into
the medium through which Hong Kong investment is initiated, The
results are presented in TABLE IV-3 and TABLE IV-4.
TABLE IV-3
FIRMS' ATTITUDES TO GOVERNMENT'SINDUCEMENTS
(11 responses)
Inducements No* of mention












Mediums No. of mention
Field investigation by Hong Kong investors
or companies' representative 6
Promotional efforts of Singapore Government
and its agencies 4
Invitation by Singapore t s firms 3
Invitation by Singapore's Chambers of
Commerce 1
Others 3
Based on the findings of the survey, and supplemented by
the information obtained from subsequent personal interviews
with the directors or managers of $ Hong Kong companies which
had subsidiaries or associated companies in Singapore, the
writer attempts to make some further analysis of how these
reasons worked in the actual situation. To facilitate this
analysis, investment by Hong Kong industrialists in Singapore
is divided into two periods: the pre-1967 period and the post-
1967 period.
I. THE PRE-1967 PERIOD
The flow of Hong Kong capital to Singapore was heavy in
the years immediately after the 1967 political disturbance in
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Hong Kong. This can be clearly seen from TABLE V-2 in the next
chapter. But even before the 1967 disturbance, there were already
some investments made by Hong Kong industrialists in Singapore,
particularly investment in the textile industry.
For investments in non-textile industries, the main
consideration was Singapore's easy access to foreign markets.
There is no doubt that Singapore could serve as an excellent export
base for the anticipated Singapore-Malaysian CommonMarket--a
protected market of over ten million people with, probably the
second highest purchasing power in Asia besides Japan--and the
markets of Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand
For investment in the textile industry,1 especially those
undertaken before 1965, the main reason. was to avoid. import restr-
ictions imposed on Hong Kong-made cotton textiles by some developed
countries. That is to say,. to maintain export shares in the United
States and United Kingdom following the cotton textile agreements
limiting direct exports from Hong Kong,2 particularly the increased
categorization of the United Kingdom quota from four to thirty four
items in Feb. 1964.3 This is especially true for textile firms
producing mainly for United Kingdom market, because Singapore was
then qualified for Commonwealth preference and was not subject to
quantitative restriction.4
There are, of course, other reasons for investment in
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textile industry. Thus, for one garment firm which was set up
in July 1963, the main purpose was to expand its parent company's
overseas operations by utilizing Singapore as a base for export-
ing to Canada and Middle East. For another firm, a joint venture
established in Feb. 1964 with Hong Kong majority ownership, the
main reason was Singapore Government's inducement and special
promotion measure, especially long-term loans.5
II* THE POST-1967 PERIOD
The acceleration of Hong Kong's private direct investment
in Singapore after mid-1967 was caused largely by Hong Kong's
political insecurity.6 One investor said during interview that he
had more secure feeling in Singapore than in Hong Kong. If
conditions were to worsen in Hong Kong at any time and affect
production, he would still be able to supply overseas customers
from the Singapore plant. One Hong Kong manufacturing firm shut
down its operations in Hong Kong and brought most of its skilled
technicians to Singapore to produce watch dials for local
consumption and export.
Besides political security consideration, there were a
number of other factors. Among them are: Tax incentive the
residential and citizenship inducement Singapore's social envir-
onment being similar to Hong Kong The abolition of the Hong Kong
account regulation7 Prime Minister lee Kuan Yew's visits to Hong
Kong, especially his promotional talks to Hong Kong industrialists
50
and good industrial relations after 1968.
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1. From the data obtained from EDB, at least eleven textile
manufacturing firms with Hong Kong capital participation were
established in Singapore before 1965. Among them, seven
pioneer firms commencedproduction before March, 1964 with
four were wholly owned by Hong Kong capitalo
2. Since 1959, Hong Kong has enforced a quota system governing
exports of cotton textiles to United Kingdom. This was follow-
ed by quotas on exports to United States under the short-term
international cotton agreement introduced on Oct. 1, 1961.
After this, quotas on exports to Canada, West Germany, Italy,
Norway and France followed. See Kayser Sung and P .H .fly . Jones
(eds.), Asian Textile Survey 1967-1968, published by the Far
Eastern Economic Review Ltd., Hong Kong, 1967, pp. 65 and 66.
3. At the beginning of Feb., 1964, Hong Kong agreed to accept a
new categorisation arrangement Linder which the categories of
Hong Kong's exports to United Kingdom would be expanded from
four categories to thirty four categories, although the total
annual quota would remain at the level of 1$5 million square
yards and 6.3 million pounds of cotton yarn.s. See Kiel
Ruscoe's Annual Hong Kong Register 1964, Hong Kong, 1964, p.
95.
4. Prior to 1965, exports of Singapore-made cotton textile
products to the United Kingdom, United States or other develop-
ed countries were not subject to any restraints. In 1965, the
United Kingdom first announced the restrictions on imports of
cotton textile products from Singapore a In addition, exports
of cotton textiles to the United States were governed by an
FOOTNOTES
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understanding concluded between the two countries on Aug.,
1966, which provided for voluntary controls on exports in
accordance with an agreed restraint schedule, retroactive from
April 1, 1966 until March 31, 1969* See Kayser Sung and P .H .
M. Jones (eds.), op,. cit., pp. 155-57.
5. The Hong Kong industrialist told the writer that he had obtained
S1 millon loan from the Development Bank of Singapore to be
repaid in.ten years.
6. But according to a survey by the Commerce and Industry Departme-
nt of Hong Kong in 1967, it was reported that of the twenty
four companies which had already established or were considering
establishing subsidiary plants outside Hong Kong, all stated the
decision to invest overseas (notably Singapore, Taiwan and South
Korea) had been taken before the disturbances. In addition,
the spokesman said that their decision to do so was influenced
by economic and trading factors rather than by political consi-
derations. See South China Morning Post, Jan. 4, 196e.
7• Prior to July 2$, 1967, any person resident in Hong Kong,
unless with permission granted by the Controller of Foreign
Exchange, Singapore, may not make any payment or part with any
securities, invest or otherwise deal with the accounts in his
favor in Singapore. This regulation has created unnecessary
restriction on Hong Kong residents who, as residents of the
Scheduled Territories, should be entitled to the use of their
funds within the Sterling Area. The Singapore Government has,
therefore, decided that effect from July 28, 1967, such
restrictions will be abolished forewith and Hong Kong residents
will be treated henceforth, for purpose of exchange control,
as any other residents of the Scheduled Territories. See
Singapore International Chamber of Commerce, Economic Bulletin,
July 31, 1967, po 7.
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CHAPTERV
PROFILE OF HONGKONGINVESTMENTIN SINGAPORE
EXTENT AND IMPORTANCE
The flow of Hong Kong capital to Singapore, the third
largest source of foreign capital, was quite heavy immediately
after the May, 1967 riots in Hong Kong. It has been estimated
that from May, 1967 to July 1, 1967, no less than S$90 million
had flowed into Singapore from Hong Kong-al This figure may be
exaggerated, but it is evident that the amount of Hong Kong
capital flowed to Singapore since May, 1967 is much greater
than the amount before that date, the latter amount is estimated
at about S$10 million. If we compare the amounts of Hong Kong's
investment in Singapore's pioneer industries before and after
1967, it is obvious that 76% of Hong Kong's investment in
Singapore was after 1967.2
As shown in TABLE V-1, in terms of paid-up capital,
Hong Kong has invested a total of S$50 million in Singapore's
manufacturing industries as of end of 1969. The bulk of the
investment (or 78% of the total) went into the pioneer industries.
In terms of total foreign investment in Singapore, Hong Kong
contributed 10.5% in all pioneer and non-pioneer industries, and
11.5% in pioneer industries*
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TABLE V-1
THE TREND, EXTENT AND IMPORTANCEOF HONGKONGINVESTMENT
IN SINGAPORE
Unit: S61000
Paid--up capital (l)Hong Kong capital (2)Total foreign
as at capitalAmount As a % of (2)
1. March 31, 1964
Pioneer firms: 1, 500 3.9 3Q 9 2OO
2. Dec . 31, 1966
Pioneer firms: 6.49,366 146,965
3. Dec. 31, 1969








firms: 41, 600 1001 41 4, 000
Note: *Estimated
Source: Based mainly on data from EDB's annual reports
and other materials supplied to the
writer by EDB.
CHARACTERISTICS
One of the characteristics of Hong Kong's investment
in Singapore was that once the investors made up their mind
to invest, they preferred to use their own capitalo3 They were
interested in joint ventures only if the gestation period is
long. Nevertheless, there were still a good number of joint
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ventures either with Singapore partners or with other foreignerso
By the end of 1970, there were 93 firms with Hong Kong
capital participation, of which 59 were granted pioneer status.
This accounted for 19% of Singapore's total number of manufact-
uring firms and 23% of its pioneer firms .4
Most of these 93 firms were jointly owned by Hong Kong
and Singapore investors, a few were multi-nationally owned.
One of such firms was jointly owned by Hong Kong, Singapore
and Taiwan capital another was established with Singapore,
Philippines and Malaysia capital. And one leather firm had
Denmark capital participation.
TABLE V-2 shows the number of new firms with Hong Kong
capital participation for each year from 1961 to 1970.
TABLEVo-2
NO. OF NEWFIRMS WITH HONGKONGCAPITAL
PARTICIPATION IN SINGAPORE, BY YEAR
(IN PRODUCTION)
Year No 0 of firms No. of pioneer firms
1961 2 1
1962 1
1963 5 51964 8 71965 5 31966 10 6
1967 10 6
196$ 23 151969 22 121970 7 4
Total 93 59
Source: Rearranged by the writer from data obtained directly
from EDB
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In terms of industrial groups, Hong Kong's investment
showed a high concentration in the two groups of textiles and
garments and chemicals and chemical products. There were 40
firms in these two areas: 24 in textiles and garments, 16 in
chemicals and chemical products. It is noteworthy that of
the 31 pioneer textile firms in Singapore, 5 22 had Hong Kong
interests, and most of them were wholly owned by Hong Kong
capital. The distribution of Hong Kong investment among
various industrial groups in Singapore as of end of 1970 is
shown in TABLE V-3.
TABLE V-3
NO, OF FIRMS WITH HONGKONGCAPITAL PARTICIPATION, BY
INDUSTRIAL GROUPSAS AT DEC. 31, 1970
TotalIndustrial group Pioneer
Food and beverages 4 2
Textiles and garments 24 22
Wood and paper products 7 5
2Rubber and leather products
16Chemicals and chemical products 9
Petroleum and petroleum products
2Non-metallic mineral products
6Metals and engineering products 3Electrical and electronic
products 3 1
Plastic products a 5Printing 3Miscellaneous 16 12
Total 93 59
Source: Prepared by the writer from data obtained directly
from EDB
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TABLE V-4 shows the distribution of Hong Kong investment
in Singapore by locationo It is clear that the majority of the
factories were located in Jurong Industrial Estate and Kallang
Basin o
TABLEV- 4
FM S WITH HONGKONGCAPITAL PARTICIPATION, BY DISTRICTS
AS AT DECEMBER31, 1970
District Number As a % of total
Jurong Industrial Estate 50 53.6
Kallang Basin 11 13.8
Tanglin Halt Industrial Estate 7 7.5
Redhil]. Industrial Estate 3 3.2
Other sites 22 23.6
Total 100.093
Source: Prepared by the writer based on the data obtained
directly from EDB.
ORGANISATIONANDMANAGEVIENT
In a good number of ventures jointly owned by Hong Kong
and local capital, the local partners were former importers or
agents for the firms in Hong Kong, In the case of multi-
nationally-owned ventures, the partners usually are the residents
of Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan. Of the 93 firms with Hong
Kong capital participation, at 'least* 12 were wholly owned by
Hong Kong capital, especially the textile firms (see footnote 3).
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Even in the joint or multi-nationally-owned ventures, the Hong
Kong investors were usually the main share-holders.
The management of the firms with Hong Kong interests
varied between each othero In the case of joint ventures
with local partners, at least one person from Hong Kong parti-
cipated in the management. In some cases, even when the Hong
Kong investors were in the minority position, the local
partners still wanted the Hong Kong partners to participate
in the management and to take charge of the factory operation
due to the inexperience of the former.
In the case of subsidiaries, the policy and major
decisions were made by their parent companies in Hong Kong.
Besides the top management personnel, the middle management
personnel were also from Hong Kong, only junior staffs were
recruited in Singapore. The Singapore subsidiaries need not
worry about such things as raw materials, foreign markets or
training of local workers. They just produce what the
parent companies decided to produce and take charge of the
local sales. In matters of major decisions, they had to seek
approval from their parent companies, such as capital invest-
ment, product change and diversification, pricing policy, etc.
Minor decision were made by local management with parent
companies kept informed of such decisions,
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RATE OF RETURNON INVESTMENT
Statistics for rate of return on Hong Kong investment
in Singapore are not available. From the writer's question-
naire survey and personal interviews, it was learned that at
least four firms suffered loss in 1966 and 1969, and twelve
firms were making less than 15% return on their investments.
It is noteworthy that most of, the firms that earned profits
were the export-oriented subsidiaries of Hong Kong firms.
t*eneraliy speaxing, profit rate in Singapore was
lower than in Hong Kong. In fact, high profit was not the
motivating force for Hong Kong industrialists to invest in
Singapore,
SALES
Generally speaking, only a minority of the firms with
Hong Kong capital participation confined their sales to
Singapore. These are the non-textile firms. Although they
are protected by tariffs and import quotas, they face the
problem of limited internal demand and sham internal competi®
tion.
The majority of the firms sell their products in
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Some sell their products
to United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Continental Europe,
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and developing countries. The proportion of their exports to,
production ranged from 50% to 100°f. At least four textile
firms exported 90° to 100% of their products to United States,
United Kingdom and Canadao
EIVIPLOYMENT
Unlike the firms with capital from the developed
countries such as United Kingdom, United States and Japan, firms
with Hong Kong capital participation are mainly engaged in labor
intensive industries. This explains the relatively large number
of workers employed by these firms,
As of end of. Sept., 1970, firms with Hong Kong interests
have provided jobs for 20,177 persons of whom86 are employed
by the pioneer firms. The largest employers are the textile and.
chemical firms which represent 46% of the total number of workers
employed by firms with Hong Kong interests. The number of
workers in firms with Hong Kong capital participation is shown
in TABLE V-5.
TA13LEV--5
MdPLOYMENTPROVIDEDBY FIRMS WITH HONGKONGCAPITAL
PARTICIPATION AS OF SEPT. 30, 1970
Employment (NO.) As a of (1)
Partially Hong Kong-owned firms:
(1) Total 20,177








Wholly Hong Kong-owned firms: 4,e20 23o9
Note: 'Including vegetable oil, animal oil, and fats.
Source: Obtained from EDB.
RECRUITMENT,-WAGES.-ANDLABOURSITUATION
Firms with Hong Kong interests usually adopt a policy of
hiring the younger Chinese. They give them on-the-job training
for technical skills. They use interviews and sometimes written
tests to select workers and clerical staffs. In recruiting the
workers, many of the firms relied upon their employees to bring
their relatives and friends for selection.
With regard to wages, based on the writer's mail questi-
onnaire survey and personal interviews, the basic wages paid to
local workers were lower than in Hong Kong. The daily wage rate
usually ranged from S$3.50 to S O-50 for unskilled and semi-
skilled workers, and from 55.00 to S O-50 for skilled workers.
But if the fringe benefits--such as paid holidays, sick leaves,
subsidised meal as well as medical care--were included, the
labour wage in Singapore would seem to be higher than in Hong
Kong,6
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Concerning the labour situation in Singapore, a typical
comment was that made by the managing director of a textile
firm who described it as follows:
Singapore's labour situation--discipline, Union demands,
etc.--is improving all the time. Seven years ago when we first
come to Singapore from Hong Kong, the situation in Singapore was
worse than Hong Kong. We belive now Singapore is equal to Hong
Kong, if not better. And we belive it will be much better than




1. Singapore bankers and. financiers had confirmed that by July 1.,
1967 no less than 3890 million of Hong Kong capital had gone
to Singapore following the disturbance which began in May,
1967, and some of it had been firmly committed for local.
investment. See Sin Chew Jit Poh (Singapore), July 2, 1967.
2. Since the figure of Hong Kong's investment in pioneer and non-
pioneer industries by the end of 1966 is not evai.l.able, the
writer has to use the figures of investment in pioneer inc?ust--
ries to compare the two periods of pre-1967 and 1967-69 by
deducting the amount of capital investment by the end of 1966
from the amount of capital investment by the end of 1.969, and
then dividing:
(S$39,000,000 - S$9, 366, ooo)/S 39, ooo, o00 = 76/0
. Based on the results from mail questionnaire survey and
personal interviews, and on other supplementary data, there
are at least twelve Singapore firms wholly owned by Hong Kong
capital, especially the textile firms.
4. By the criterion of either employing 50 people and above or
having a fixed investment of at least S$250,,000, there were
490 manafacturing firms in production in Singapore at the
end of 1970, of which 250 were pioneer firms. See Singapore
Trade and Industry, Jan., 1971, Pp. 105-117
5. From data supplied to the writer by EDB.
6. This was the view of some of the directors of the firms, In.
Hong Kong, the range of the daily wages for the manufacturing
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industries at the end of 1970 was HK$11.0 (5:5.60) to HK$37
(5$1e.9) for skilled workers HK$p7.0 (S$3.6) to HK$26.0
(S$13.4) for semi-skilled workers and HK$6.2 (S$3.2) to
HK$16.3 (S$8.4) for unskilled workers. See Hong Kong
Government, Annual Report, 1970, p. 19. The overall average
daily wages for industrial workers was HK$14.31 (S$?7.3) ,
excluding fringe benefits and HK$16.45 (S$8.4) , including
fringe benefits in March, 1970. See Hong Kong, Census and
Statistics Dept., Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics,






In terms of direct economic contribution, private direct
investment has the following merits: it provides foreign exchange
needed for acquiring foreign machineries and equipment it
provides employment opportunities for local nationals it contr-
ibutes to host country's government revenue and it brings
capital formation to the host country,
As mentioned by Meier,' the less direct benefits from
private direct investment are likely in the form of external
economies. Besides bringing to the recipient country physical
and financial capital, private direct investment also effects
transfer of non-monetary resources---technological knowledge,
market information, managerial and supervisory personnel, organ-
isational experience, and innovations in products and production
techniques. A.s a carrier of technological and organisational
change, private direct investment may be highly significant in
providing private technical assistance and demonstration
effects that are of benefit elsewhere in the host country's
economy. In addition, private direct investment tends to
contribute more to the creation of a money market and the
channeling of savings into manufacturing than local investment
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can contribute. All these economies do not appear to be quanti-
fiable, but they are perhaps the most important contributions of
private direct investment,
However, such benefits of private direct investment have
to be weighed against the costs that are incurred in the host
country in connection with the foreign investment. For example,
the government of the recipient country may have to provide
explicit or hidden subsidies in order to attract foreign invest-
ment. Such subsidies may include tax concessions,_export incen-
tives, and additional public services or special facilities,
such as industrial estates and tariff protection. All these
have a cost in absorbing governmental resources that could be
used elsewhere,
Perhaps the most significant cost of foreign investment
tends to be associated with balance of payments adjustment when
the return flow of interests, profits and principal puts press-
ure on the recipient country's balance of payments particularly
when the investment is in the import-subsititute industries.2
Nevertheless, it seems that on the whole, the benefits
from private foreign investment outweigh the costs or disadvan-
tages. Based on this understanding, this chapter attempts to
evaluate what contributions the Hong Kong investors have made
to Singapore economy in terms of capital formation, balance of
payments, government revenue, employment, and improvement in
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skills. Actually, an accurate evaluation of the contributions
should take into consideration indirect as well as direct and
short-term as well as long-term contributions, But it is
evidently beyond the writer's ability to do so.
CAPITAL FORMATIONIN THE MANUFACTURINGSECTOR
As shown in TABLE VI-1, the Hong Kong investors have,
as of end of 1969, invested a total paid-up capital of S50
million in manufacturing industries, accountjng .for 5o3jo of
the total paid-up capital of Singapore's manufacturing
industries. Of this S$50 million, S$39 million were invested
in pioneer industries, Investment in fixed assets amounted to
S$52 million, which accounted for 4.7% of the total fixed
capital formation in Singapore's manufacturing sector.
TABLE VI-1
CONTRIBUTIONTO CAPITAL FORMATIONAS AT END OP 1969
Unit: S$tOOO
(1)Hong Kong (_?)Singapore
Amount manufacturingAs a % of (2)
Paid-up capital:
All mfg. firms 50,000 5.3 937, 207Pioneer firms
only 6.6.39,000 587, 629
Fixed assets:
In all mfg,
industries 52,000 4.7 1, 095, Q12
Source: Data obtained from EDB and EDB Annual Report, 1969,Appendix 11.3
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BALANCEOF PAYMENTSAND GOVERNMENTREVENUE
Nearly all the machineries and equipments installed in
firms with Hong Kong interests in Singapore were imported from
abroad besides, they also imported a substantial proportion
of raw materials. But these firms had a higher ratio of
equity participation as compared with firms invested by other
countries. They also has a higher ratio of sales abroad.
Based on the mailed questionnaire-survey and personal intervi-
ews, the 1969 sales value of seven firms in Singapore with
Hong Kong capital participation are shown below.
TABLE VI-2
SALES VALUE OF SEVEN FIRMS WITH HONGKONGCAPITA
Unit: S$ million
T-otal Exports as % ofIndustry group No. of firms Exports
sales total sales
Textile and
garments 4 32.5 27 .1 83
Others 3 6.27.95 78
Total 7 40.45 33.3 80.5
As shown in TABLE VI-2, the amount of foreign exchange
earned and saved of some seven firms with Hong Kong capital
participation was about S$40 million for the year 1969, of
which S$3.3 million (80.5% of total sales) was export sales.
This amount, of course, only represents a part of balance of
PARTICIPATION IN SINGAPORE, 1969
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payments effect of Hong Kong investment on Singapore economy.
Data concerning the return flow of capital (i.e.,
dividends and interest) to Hong Kong are not available. As
a matter of fact, few firms have been able to make substan-
tial profits, so that the problem of return flow of capital
has scarcely arisen. Besides, the contribution to government
revenue was negligible, since most. of the firms are still in
their tax holiday.
EMPLOYMENT
During the early years of Singapore's industrial
development, there was a substantial pool of unemployment
labour, so that the first major contribution that any foreign
investment could make was the relaxation of the unemployment
situation. Since the firms with Hong Kong capital participation
were mostly of the labour-intensive type, it did make a signi-
ficant contribution to Singapore's employment. By Sent., 1970,
these firms had employed 20,177 persons, accounting for 16% of
the total number of workers in Singapore's manufacturing
industries. Among them, textile firms accounted for 51%. It
is noteworthy that workers employed by wholly Hong Kong-owned
firms accounted for 3.8% of Singapore's total manufacturing




CONTRIBUTIONTO EMPLOYMENTIN SINGAPOREBY FIRrIS
WITH HONGKONGCAPITAL PARTICIPATION
(1)A11 mfg, firms (2)Firms with HK ca.- o.**
in Singapore* No. As a%4f (1)
Total: 126,449 20,177 16.0
Pioneer firms only: 17,377
Firms in the textile
and garment
field: 17 , 208 8, 759 50.9




Hong Kong capital: 4,820 3.8
IVote: *As of end of 1970 Prelim.)
**As of Sept. 30, 1970.
***Including vegetable oil, animal oil, and fats.
****As_a per cent of total employment in Singapore's
manufacturing sector.
Source: (1)Monthly Digest of Statistics (Singapore), Vol. X,
No, 2, Feb., 1971, p. 26.
(2)Obtained from EDB.
IMPROVEMENTIN SKILLS
The most important contribution to industrial develop-
ment in Singapore by Hong Kong industrialists has been the
transfer of new technology, managerial skills and other busin-
ess techniques to Singapore. In fact, Hong Kong industrialists
not only took lead in the establishment of textile industry,
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they also helped developing chemicals and chemical products,'
plastic products, wood and paper products, etc. Moreover,
most of the firms with significant capital participation from
Hong Kong or subsidiaries of firms in Hong Kong first brought
their technicians and experts from Hong Kong to Singapore or
sent local technicians abroad for training before they started
production. One textile firm has, during the past seven years,
sent a total of 120 technicians from its Hong Kong parent
company to Singapore to train local workers it has also sent
more than 30 local skilled workers to Japan to learn advanced
techniques. Although it was these firms that directly benefit-
ed from the improvement in skills, eventually the whole economy
would also benefit. Such external economies are not quantifi-
able, but they are perhaps the most important contribution that
foreign investments can make to the host country.
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FOOTNOTES
1. See G.M. Meier, The International Economics of Development,
New York, Harper and Row, 1968, pp. 141-142.




MAJORPROBLEMSFACEDBY FIRMS WITH HONGKONG
CAPITAL PARTICIPATION
The majority of firms in Singapore with Hong Kong
capital participation claimed that Singapore was short of
management personnel., production technicians and skilled
workers that there was a high turnover rate among skilled
workers. They complained that well trained workers were di-
fficult to find. Most firms employed workers who had some
experience in an allied line of production and gave them
training. Generally speaking, it needs more time to train
local workers to the required level of skill than in Hong
Kong.
This may have something to do with worker's attitudes
toward work and income in Singapore. Because life in Singapore
was relatively simple, so the workers are less materialistics
in outlook than they are in Hong Kong. They are unwilling to
work overtime and do not care much about keenin time.
Some manufacturers claimed that although the wage
level in Singapore was little lower than in Hong Kong, the
fringe benefits were substantial. If fringe benefits were
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included, the labour cost would be higher than in Hong Kong.
For those firms whose principal motivation for inve-
sting in Singapore was the anticipation of a large Malaysian
CommonMarket when Singapore still remained in Malaysia, the
Singapore market itself was rather limited and they therefore
faced the problem of under-utilization of capacity.1 Even the
export-oriented firms had difficulty in competing in foreign
markets because of high production cost and low quality of
products manufactured in Singapore,
One of the firms complained that the EDB did not
provide assistance when a firm was in trouble after it became
established in Singapore. But most of the firms opined that
the EDB was trying its best to help, although its staffs,
particularly the middle level staffs, were too young and lack-
ed experience.
Some of the firms that were located in Jurong Industr-
ial Estate complained that they had difficulties in recruiting
workers because of lack of low cost housing facilities for
workers o
Major problems faced by Hong Kong investors in Singa-




MAJORPROBLEMSFACEDBY FIRMS WITH HONGKONG
CAPITAL PARTICIPATION
(18 responses)
:raj or problems Yo. of mention
12Lack of qualified management personnel
Lack of production technicians 10
Limited internal demand- 7
Keen competition in overseas market 6
Under-utilization of capacity 6
Rising labour cost 5
Inconveniences or difficulties in the




Hong Kong industrialists have invested and are invest-
ing in Singapore. They have been playing a valuable role in
accelerating the growth of Singapore's industries. As of end
of 1969, they have invested a paid-up capital of S$50 million,
which is the third largest amount from various foreign sources,
and have inve-sted S$52 million in fixed assets. The number of
firms with Hong Kong capital participation was $6 at end of
1969, increased to 93 at end'of 1970. These firms have provi-
ded employment for over 20,000 persons and have manufactured a
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variety of industrial products, mainly textiles and garments.,
chemical and plastic products. These firms, largely in the
form of joint ventures, have not only given Singapore the
advantages of advanced technology, managerial skills and
other business techniques which Singapore lacked, but have
also provided sure sources of raw materials and markets for
Singapore,
Despite some problems such as lack of qualified
management personnel and production technicians and limited
internal demand, Singapore has nevertheless, its general
attractiveness for Hong Kong industrialists. Its strategic
location and excellent infrastructure have served as a base
for production and export to world markets. Moreover, in
contrast to the Government of Hong Kong which although put up
fewer restraints on business but offered no incentives either,
the Government of Singapore has done a great deal to assist
foreign investors through its various incentive measures.
Perhaps the most important factor in the long run is Singapore's
political stability which Hong Kong can hardly match. With
rentals and land costs soaring in Hong Kong, there will




1. In fact, plant-underutilization is a phenomenon commonto
Singapore's manufacturing industries. It is reported that
.for the year 1970 Singapore's pioneer factories utilized,
on the average, only 69% of their capacity. See Business
Time (Singapore), Jan. 1, 1971.
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於
擁
有
香
港
資
金
之
新
加
坡
廠
商
之
經
營
方
式
多
採
勞
工
集
約
式
，
故
在
就
業
方
面
之
貢
獻
甚
為
顯
著
。
根
據
資
料
，
截
至
1一
九
七
○
年
九
月
底
，
港
資
廠
商
共
提
供
二
萬
個
以
上
就
業
機
會
—
—
約
占
新
加
坡
製
造
業
總
勞
工
人
數
之
十
六
百
仙
—
—
予
新
加
坡
公
民
。
　
　
香
港
工
業
家
對
新
加
坡
之
最
重
要
貢
獻
，
厥
為
先
進
工
藝
与
工
商
業
管
理
技
術
等
之
轉
移
。
事
實
上
，
他
們
不
但
在
紡
織
業
居
於
領
導
地
位
，
而
且
也
幫
助
促
進
化
學
与
塑
膠
等
工
業
之
發
展
。
更
重
在
的
是
：
多
數
擁
有
大
量
香
港
資
金
之
新
加
坡
廠
商
或
香
港
廠
商
在
新
加
坡
之
附
屬
公
司
，
多
於
開
始
正
式
生
產
之
前
帶
同
技
師
与
專
家
至
新
加
坡
訓
練
當
地
工
人
，
或
派
遣
後
者
至
外
國
受
訓
。
8　
　
㈤
在
新
加
坡
投
資
所
遭
遇
之
困
難
：
　
　
多
數
擁
有
香
港
資
金
之
新
加
坡
廠
商
，
認
為
新
加
坡
缺
少
管
理
人
材
、
生
產
技
師
，
及
技
術
工
人
。
此
外
，
若
干
製
造
商
認
為
新
加
坡
之
工
資
水
準
雖
稍
低
於
香
港
，
但
工
資
以
外
之
額
外
利
益
却
極
可
观
，
若
計
及
此
等
利
益
，
則
新
加
坡
之
工
資
水
準
反
高
於
香
港
。


